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Rediscovering Capture: Antitrust Federalism and 
the North Carolina Dental Case 
 
Herbert Hovenkamp1 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The federal antitrust laws are concerned almost entirely with private restraints. The 
Sherman Act's legislative history provides little evidence that Congress intended for antitrust to 
ride herd on anticompetitive or badly designed state regulation. The question itself is 
anachronistic, however. In 1890 and even in 1914 when the Clayton Act was passed the 
prevailing interpretation of the Commerce Clause would have precluded the reach of federal 
antitrust into internal state economic policy, to say nothing of the policy of local governments. 
For their part, the states in the late nineteenth century were precluded from regulating conduct 
that crossed a state line.
2
 
Conflicts between federal antitrust law and state regulation did not frequently arise prior 
to the Supreme Court's 1942 decision in Wickard v. Filburn,
3
 which expanded federal power to 
reach conduct or transactions that "affected" interstate commerce. Following Wickard, the Court 
held a few years later in Women's Sportswear Manufacturing that the Sherman Act reached a 
completely intrastate cartel of garment stitchers when their product was later shipped across state 
lines.
4
 
During the era of "dual federalism" that prevailed in the 1930s and earlier, federal power 
did not reach activity unless it encompassed more than a single state, and the states had power to 
regulate only within their borders. One important exception permitting state extraterritorial 
control was corporation law. Early in the twentieth century some states began to authorize their 
corporations to do business outside the state and also to acquire equity interest in other 
corporations, or corporate mergers.
5
 Already in 1904, however, the Supreme Court held that the 
legality of an interstate corporate merger under state corporation law did not immunize the 
transaction from the Sherman Act.
6
 While the merger in question was accomplished through a 
New Jersey incorporation act that permitted holding companies, the railroads involved operated 
between the Great Lakes and the West Coast, entirely outside of that state and quite far from it. 
In condemning the merger under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the Supreme Court did not 
question New Jersey's power to authorize an extraterritorial transaction in this fashion— 
                                                 
1
 Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor, Univ. of Iowa College of Law.  
2
 E.g., Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Rwy. Co. v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 557 (1886) (negative Commerce Clause 
precluded state from price regulating even the intrastate portion of an interstate route). 
3
 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
4
 United States v. Women’s Sportswear Mfg. Ass’n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949). 
5
 See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND AMERICAN LAW, 1836-1937 at 56-66 (1991). 
6
 Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 345-346 (1904). 
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 3 
however, in doing so it could not interfere with national competition policy over interstate 
commerce: “It cannot be said that any state may give a corporation…authority to restrain 
interstate…commerce against the will of…Congress.”
7
 
Serious conflicts between state power to regulate internal markets and federal antitrust 
emerged after the full implications of Wickard v. Filburn became obvious for areas that were 
traditionally subject to state regulation. In the South-Eastern Underwriters case (1944) the 
Supreme Court extended federal antitrust law to the business of insurance, a market that had 
traditionally been regulated entirely by state law.
8
 That decision soon prompted federal 
legislation, the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which restored insurance regulation to the states and 
granted a partial antitrust immunity.
9
 The Supreme Court first acknowledged the modern "state 
action" antitrust exemption for state-sanctioned conduct in Parker v. Brown.
10
 The principal 
difference between the Women's Sportswear case and Parker was that the cartel in the former 
case was purely private, while the raisin cartel in Parker was initiated and managed by the state. 
The South-Eastern Underwriters decision and subsequent passage of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act serves as a good object lesson: If the Supreme Court does interpret statutory 
federal antitrust policy in a way that diminishes state power, Congress can always intervene. It 
did so again with the Local Government Antitrust Act,
11
 which responded to the Supreme Court's 
liability-expanding Boulder decision by largely taking damages off the table.
12
 
The expansion of federal commerce power naturally invited reconsideration of one of the 
most central concerns of federalism: namely, the power of state governments to regulate their 
own economies in the face of conflicting federal policies favoring competition.
13
 The resulting 
antitrust principles were judge-made, although they at least purported to be inferred from 
congressional intent: 
First, it seems clear that Congress never intended to displace sovereign state regulation of 
their own internal economies in any significant way, and most of the legislative history of federal 
antitrust speaks of federal-state cooperation rather than preemption.
14
 
Second, however, nothing prevents the federal antitrust laws from being applied to 
private economic conduct within their reach, even under an affecting commerce test. Indeed, 
Congress itself has spoken on this issue. While the language of the Sherman Act is very broad, 
the original language of the substantive Clayton Act and FTC Act provisions was not, reaching 
only restraints in the actual course of interstate commerce. That limitation reflected the dual 
                                                 
7
 Id. at 346. 
8
 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).  On the traditional view, see Paul v. 
Virginia, 75 U.S. 168, 183–84 (1868). 
9
15 U.S.C. §§ 1101–1102; see 1A PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶219 (4th 
ed. 2013). 
10
 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
11
1A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶223d. 
12
 Cmty. Commc’ns Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 65 n.2 (1982); Local Government Antitrust Act, 
Pub. L. 98-544, 98 Stat. 2750 (1984), 15 U.S.C. §§34-36. See 1A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶223c. 
13
 On concerns of federalism that arose in the wake of Wickard, see HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF 
AMERICAN LAW: NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT, 1870-1970 at 294-298 (2015). 
14
 See Herbert Hovenkamp, State Antitrust in the Federal Scheme, 58 IND.L.J. 375 (1983). 
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federalism of the period in which the Clayton Act was passed.
15
 However, after the Wickard 
principle was well established Congress amended Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act in 1975
16
 and Section 7 of the Clayton Act in 1980
17
 so as to reach restraints "in or 
affecting" commerce. It chose not to amend Sections 2 and 3 of the Clayton Act, dealing with 
price discrimination and tying.
18
 
The "commerce" delimiter on federal authority is also very important for identifying the 
proper scope of antitrust federalism. The federal antitrust laws are passed under the commerce 
power, and they explicitly apply only to restraints that affect commerce.
19
 They were never 
intended to be a device for ensuring good government. State and local governments might pass a 
wide variety of very bad laws that do not implicate federal antitrust policy for the simple reason 
that they have nothing to do with commerce. Further, the Tenth Amendment is designed to 
prohibit federal encroachment on state regulatory prerogatives, and also acts as an important 
break on federal legislation passed under the commerce power.
20
 
The distinction between "private" conduct and the conduct of a sovereign state is critical 
in the post-Wickard world. If a state is regulating within its territory and it is actually the state 
that is doing the regulating, then the highly general language of the antitrust laws generally 
requires federal antitrust tribunals to stand aside. Federal antitrust has no power to police bad 
state regulation as such. It cannot require that state regulations pass a cost-benefit test that might 
weed out some instances of badly designed regulation.
21
 But it can properly insist on a showing 
that the conduct in question be that of the state, and not of a private entrepreneur. 
The antitrust “state action” doctrine addresses this problem by trying to identify the line 
between sovereign state conduct, which is largely immune from federal antitrust oversight, and 
private conduct, which is not. After nearly forty years of litigation the Supreme Court adopted 
the modern two-prong “Midcal” test,
22
 which after subsequent elaboration, states: 
1. “Sovereign” conduct performed by the “state” itself is immune; and 
2. “Private” conduct must be both (a) authorized by the state, and (b) any anticompetitive 
consequences must be “actively supervised” by a government official. 
These prongs have been further refined:  
3. In between the extremes defined by numbers (1) and (2) is conduct by state-created 
government subdivisions that are not “sovereign” under the United States Constitution 
                                                 
15
 E.g., United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) 
(applying E.C. Knight to strike down federal child labor provision). See HOVENKAMP, OPENING, supra note 13 at 
278-299. 
16
 15 U.S.C. §45(a)(2). 
17
 94 Stat. 1159, 15 U.S.C. §18. 
18
 See 1A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9, ¶¶265, 267. 
19
 See id., ¶ ¶260-262. 
20
 On the Tenth Amendment as a constraint on federal antitrust law, see id.,  ¶¶215-217. 
21
 Cf. Exec. Order No. 12291 (President Ronald Reagan), 46 FR 13193 (Feb. 17, 1981). See Michael A. 
Livermore & Richard L. Revesz, Regulatory Review, Capture, and Agency Inaction, 101 GEO. L.J. 1337 (2013); 
Richard L. Revesz, Quantifying Regulatory Benefits, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1423 (2014). 
22
 From Cal. Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n, v. Midcal Aluminum, 445 U.S. 97 (1980), hereinafter “Midcal.” See 
1A AREEDA & HOVENKAMP, supra note 9,  ¶221f. 
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(although they may be under state law); for these, the challenged activity must be 
“authorized” but it need not be “supervised;” and 
4. The issue whether conduct is "private" or that of a state-created subdivision presents a 
federal question; that is, a state legislature's designation of a private group as an "agency" 
of the state does not necessarily make it so.
23
 
The question in North Carolina Dental, which was decided by the Supreme Court in 
February, 2015, was whether the conduct in question fell more closely to number (2), the Court’s 
majority conclusion, or number (3), which was the conclusion of the dissent. Question (4) also 
divided the majority from the dissenters. 
This multi-stage, judge-made set of inquiries is intended to enable the federal courts to 
walk the very thin and indistinct line that defines the relationship between the federal 
government and the states in the making of competition and regulatory policy. In some cases 
placing the line is easy. For example, the governor, legislators and judges are state employees 
who exercise sovereign power. This is true even though the state legislature is composed of part-
time members who also have their own businesses and whose decisions as legislators may be 
affected and even biased. 
An important brake here is that legislative action must generally be signed by the 
Governor before it becomes law. Another is that the state's highest executive, legislative, and 
judicial branches are multi-sectoral, facing competing pressures from diverse constituencies. A 
third is that most of these officials are answerable to the electorate. To one degree or another all 
of these three considerations also apply to the highest officials in municipal government. They 
do not necessarily apply, however, to specialized state agencies that may represent producers in a 
single market, be composed largely of interested decision-makers in that market, and often are 
not directly accountable to either the electorate or higher reviewers. 
As formulated, the state action doctrine is not concerned with geographic spillovers. 
Insofar as antitrust state action is concerned, the courts generally do not care whether the state 
itself experiences most of the harmful effects of anticompetitive decisions rather than exporting 
them to other states. As a result, the doctrine authorizes federal antitrust policy to dig into local 
and intrastate issues, even to the point of rescuing the state from its own improvident decisions. 
The doctrine is less concerned with one state's power to impose anticompetitive harm on other 
states, and more concerned with ensuring that each state's own processes are transparent and 
actually reflect articulated state policy. The dissenters in North Carolina Dental did not pick up 
on this point. 
II. THE NORTH CAROLINA DENTAL EXAMINERS CASE 
A. The Decision 
The North Carolina Dental Examiners case
24
 is the second time in two years that the 
Supreme Court rejected a "state action" defense to an anticompetitive arrangement that had been 
approved under state law and that very likely visited any competitive harm almost entirely on its 
own residents. In Phoebe Putney the Court unanimously held that a state statute that permitted 
                                                 
23
 See id., ¶¶224-227, which develops each of these factors. 
24
 N. C. State Board of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 135 S.Ct. 1101 ( 2015), hereinafter “N.C. Dental.” 
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two hospitals to merge did not authorize an anticompetitive merger to monopoly. As a result, it 
did not immunize the transaction from an antitrust challenge.
25
 
In both cases the problems that the Supreme Court identified are fixable by state 
legislation, although the legislation would require greater transparency about the interests that 
the state was protecting. The facts of both cases suggested—but the Court did not consider—
whether it should be relevant that the anticompetitive conduct in question was harmful mainly to 
the state's own residents. If state-sanctioned anticompetitive conduct harms mainly that state's 
own citizens should federal authorities be less concerned? 
The dispute in the Dental Examiners case reduced to one question: To what extent can a 
state simply designate a private group as a state “agency” for purposes of asserting state 
sovereignty, permitting all decision-making to be made by the unsupervised power of the market 
participants themselves, and without review by a superior and independent state official? The 
result may amount to a naked cartel, harming its customers wherever they are located. 
This question arose in the very first state action decision, Parker v. Brown, where the 
raisin cartel in question had market power within the state but exported 90 percent of its product 
to other states.
26
 In addition to the antitrust claim the Court also considered and rejected the 
challenger's argument that the raisin cartel program unconstitutionally burdened interstate 
commerce.
27
 A somewhat similar case, Goldfarb,
28
 involved the inadequately supervised fee 
setting of a state bar, presumably providing legal services to clients both inside and outside the 
state.
29
 
In N.C. Dental, by contrast, it seems clear that most of the consumers injured by the 
dental board's restrictions on teeth whitening were within the state.
30
 Indeed, to the extent the 
dental board's rule limiting the provision of teeth-whitening services to licensed dentists caused 
competitive harm, it would have encouraged North Carolina consumers to obtain their teeth 
whitening outside of the state or look for means (such as self-treatment) that were either outside 
the reach of the rule or else difficult to detect. The same thing was likely true in the Phoebe 
Putney case, involving a rural hospital in central Georgia that very likely served mainly Georgia 
residents.
31
 
A divided (6-3) Supreme Court
32
 agreed with the Fourth Circuit and the Federal Trade 
Commission that the state dental board's restriction violated the antitrust laws because it was not 
                                                 
25
 FTC v. Phoebe Putney Health Sys., 133 S.Ct. 1003 (2013). 
26
 Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
27
 Id. at 359-361. 
28
 Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975). 
29
 The district court observed that a significant number of purchasers of title insurance in Fairfax County, 
Virginia, worked outside the state. See 355 F. Supp. 491, 494 (E.D. Va. 1973). 
30
 The Federal Trade Commission spoke of harm to "consumers in North Carolina," but did not quantify the 
percentage in its opinion. See In re North Carolina Board of Dental Examiners, 152 F.T.C. 75 (2011), fact finding 
#158. 
31
 See the FTC's decision, 2013 WL 4627512 (Aug. 22, 2013) (limiting geographic market to a six county 
area).  While the Commission did not reference the Elzinga-Hogarty test for a geographic market, if applied 90 
percent of patients would have had to come from this area; See 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDA, HERBERT HOVENKAMP, 
ROGER D. BLAIR, & CHRISTINE PIETTE DURRANCE, ANTITRUST LAW ¶550a3. 
32
 Justice Kennedy's majority opinion was joined by C.J. Roberts and Justices, Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, 
and Kagan. Justice Alito dissented, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas. 
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adequately supervised by a sufficiently independent state decision-maker. The regulatory board 
in question was controlled by a majority actively engaged in the practice of dentistry.
33
 A state 
statute provided that this Board was "the agency of the State for the regulation of the practice of 
dentistry,"
34
 and it had authority over licensing as well as power to discipline the unlawful 
practice of dentistry.
35
 Nothing in the statute, however, identified teeth whitening as part of the 
practice of dentistry.
36
 Under the Act, six of the Board's eight members must be actively 
practicing dentists, and these members were elected by other licensed dentists practicing in North 
Carolina. A seventh member was required to be a dental hygienist, and an eighth "consumer" 
member was appointed by the Governor.
37
 
Dentists in North Carolina began whitening teeth in the 1990s, earning substantial fees. 
In the early 2000s, however, non-dentists entered into competition with them and charged lower 
fees, some of them operating from facilities such as cosmetic salons or kiosks in shopping 
malls.
38
 The Board received numerous complaints from dentist members. Most of these 
complaints were about the lower fees, although some also complained of possible harm to 
consumers.
39
 The Board began an investigation conducted by several dentist members of the 
Board, but excluding the hygienist and consumer members. Beginning in 2005 the Board sent 
out numerous cease-and-desist letters to non-dentists performing teeth-whitening services.
40
 At 
that point the FTC filed its complaint, challenging the rule limiting teeth whitening to licensed 
dentists and the use of the cease-and-desist letters. It concluded that the Board's conduct was a 
trade restraint prohibited by Section 5 of the FTC Act and was not immunized by the "state 
action" doctrine.
41
 The Fourth Circuit agreed.
42
 
The Supreme Court rejected the Board's argument that because its members “were 
invested by North Carolina with the power of the State,” its actions required neither 
authorization nor supervision in order to be free of antitrust scrutiny. “Here, the Board did not 
receive active supervision by the State when it interpreted the Act as addressing teeth whitening 
and when it enforced that policy by issuing cease-and-desist letters to non-dentist teeth 
whiteners."
43
 A grant of "state action" immunity applies only to "exercise[s] of the State's 
sovereign power.”
44
 That status "requires more than a mere facade of state involvement.... "
45
 
The Court then observed: 
Limits on state-action immunity are most essential when the State seeks to 
delegate its regulatory power to active market participants, for established ethical 
                                                 
33
 Id. at 1107. 
34
 Id., quoting N. C. Gen. Stat. Ann. §90–22(b) (2013). 
35
 N. C. Dental, 135 S.Ct. at 1107, citing Id., §90–40.1. 
36
 Id. at 1108. 
37
 Id. 
38
 See the Fourth Circuit's opinion, N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. F.T.C, 717 F.3d 359, 364 (4th Cir. 
2013). 
39
 N.C. Dental, 135 S.Ct. at 1108. 
40
 Id. 
41
 152 F.T.C. 75 (2011). 
42
 N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. F.T.C., 717 F.3d 359 (4th Cir. 2013). 
43
 135 S.Ct. at 1110. 
44
 Id., citing Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 374 (1991). 
45
135 S.Ct. at 1111, citing FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621, 636 (1992); and referring Parker v. 
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943). 
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standards may blend with private anticompetitive motives in a way difficult even 
for market participants to discern. Dual allegiances are not always apparent to an 
actor. In consequence, active market participants cannot be allowed to regulate 
their own markets free from antitrust accountability.....So it follows that, 
under Parker and the Supremacy Clause, the States’ greater power to attain an 
end does not include the lesser power to negate the congressional judgment 
embodied in the Sherman Act through unsupervised delegations to active market 
participants. 
... Parker immunity requires that the anticompetitive conduct of nonsovereign 
actors, especially those authorized by the State to regulate their own profession, 
result from procedures that suffice to make it the State’s own.
46
 
Speaking then of the immunity requirements of clear articulation (authorization) and 
active supervision,
47
 the Court observed: 
The first requirement—clear articulation—rarely will achieve that goal by itself, 
for a policy may satisfy this test yet still be defined at so high a level of generality 
as to leave open critical questions about how and to what extent the market should 
be regulated.... Entities purporting to act under state authority might diverge from 
the State’s considered definition of the public good. The resulting asymmetry 
between a state policy and its implementation can invite private self-dealing. The 
second Midcal requirement—active supervision—seeks to avoid this harm by 
requiring the State to review and approve interstitial policies made by the entity 
claiming immunity."
48
 
Turning to the active supervision requirement,
 49
 the Court noted that municipalities were 
exempted from it because "there is little or no danger" that they might be involved "in a private 
price fixing arrangement."
50
 Rather, the principal danger from municipal regulation was that the 
municipality might "seek to further purely parochial public interests at the expense of more 
overriding state goals."
51
 In addition, municipalities are "electorally accountable" entities, and 
they exercise regulatory power "across different economic spheres, substantially reducing the 
risk that they would pursue private interests while regulating any single field."
52
 In the case of 
municipalities, the Omni case had gone one step further, rejecting subjective tests for 
"corruption" that would have forced a "deconstruction of the governmental process" by engaging 
in "ad hoc and ex post questions of their motives for making particular decisions."
53
 
After examining its earlier decisions, the Court drew a "clear" lesson that "Midcal’s 
active supervision test is an essential prerequisite of Parker immunity for any non-sovereign 
entity—public or private—controlled by active market participants."
54
 As a result, the need for 
active supervision by the state itself turns "not on the formal designation given by States to 
                                                 
46
 Id. at 1111, citing 1A ANTITRUST LAW ¶226; Einer Elhauge, The Scope of Antitrust Process, 104 HARV. L. 
REV. 667, 672 (1991); and Merrick B. Garland, Antitrust and State Action: Economic Efficiency and the Political 
Process, 96 YALE L. J. 486, 500 (1986). 
47
 From Midcal, supra note 22. See 1A ANTITRUST LAW ¶¶224-227. 
48
 N.C. Dental, 135 S.Ct. at 1112 (emphasis added), referring to Midcal, supra note 22. 
49
 See 1A ANTITRUST LAW ¶223. 
50
 N.C. Dental, 135 S.Ct. at 1112. 
51
 Id. at 1112, quoting Hallie v. Eau Claire, 471 U.S. 34, 47 (1985). 
52
 135 S.Ct. at 1113. 
53
 Id. at 1113, citing Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365, 374 (1991). 
54
 Id. at 1113, referring to Midcal, supra note 22. See 1A ANTITRUST LAW  ¶221f. 
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regulators but on the risk that active market participants will pursue private interests in retraining 
trade."
55
 Further, "State agencies controlled by active market participants, who possess singularly 
strong private interests, pose the very risk of self-dealing Midcal’s supervision requirement was 
created to address."
56
 
The court then observed that the Court's statement in Hallie "that active state supervision 
would also not be required" of state agencies was dicta, given that the defendant in that case was 
"an electorally accountable municipality with general regulatory powers and no private price 
fixing agenda." As a result, the municipality resembled a traditional state agency rather than 
"specialized boards dominated by active market participants."
57
 As a result, 
The similarities between agencies controlled by active market participants and 
private trade associations are not eliminated simply because the former are given 
a formal designation by the State, vested with a measure of government power, 
and required to follow some procedural rules.
58
 Parker immunity does not derive 
from nomenclature alone. When a State empowers a group of active market 
participants to decide who can participate in its market, and on what terms, the 
need for supervision is manifest. The Court holds today that a state board on 
which a controlling number of decision makers are active market participants in 
the occupation the board regulates must satisfy Midcal’s active supervision 
requirement in order to invoke state-action antitrust immunity.
59
 
The Court then discussed and rejected the Board's argument that the prospect of treble 
damages would discourage citizens from public participation on such boards. It noted, first, that 
this particular case, brought by the FTC, was not such a situation, and provided no occasion to 
address the separate question of citizen members' liability for damages. Further, the state could 
always provide for defense and indemnification of such members.
60
  
The Court also rejected the argument that the Board's decision in this case should be 
treated as a type of "peer review," which is "essential to the provision of quality medical care," 
and that the specter of antitrust damages would act as a deterrent to such review. The Court 
concluded that this argument is more properly addressed to the "legislative branch," apparently 
referring to either Congress or the relevant state legislature.
61
 
Finally, the Court observed that active supervision was lacking in this case. Teeth 
whitening was not covered by the statutory provisions creating the Board and stating its duties 
and powers. Further, in this case the Board had acted against putative offenders by means of 
unilaterally sent "cease-and-desist letters threatening criminal liability, rather than any of the 
powers ... that would invoke oversight by a politically accountable official."
62
 It did not mean to 
                                                 
55
 135 S.Ct. at 1114. 
56
 Id., citing 1A ANTITRUST LAW ¶227. 
57
 135 S.Ct. at 1114. Further, “[t]here is no doubt that the members of such associations often have economic 
incentives to restrain competition and that the product standards set by such associations have a serious potential for 
anticompetitive harm.” Id. at 1114, quoting Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 U.S.492, 500 
(1988). 
58
 Citing Hallie, 471 U.S. at 39, as "rejecting 'purely formalistic' analysis." 
59
 N.C. Dental, 135 S.Ct. at 1114, citing 1A ANTITRUST LAW ¶227. 
60
135 S.Ct. at 1115. 
61
 Id. at 1116, citing Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations 
Face Antitrust Scrutiny?, 162 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 1093 (2014). 
62
135 S.Ct. at 1116. 
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suggest that a more judicially involved process, such as a request for a preliminary injunction, 
would have qualified as supervision unless judicial review in that context actually reached the 
competitive merits of the requested action. Nevertheless, the Court also stated: 
Active supervision need not entail day-to-day involvement in an agency’s 
operations or micromanagement of its every decision. Rather, the question is 
whether the State’s review mechanisms provide “realistic assurance” that a 
nonsovereign actor’s anticompetitive conduct “promotes state policy, rather than 
merely the party’s individual interests.”
63
 
The Court then provided a list of requirements for qualifying active supervision. First, 
the state supervisor "must review the substance of the anticompetitive decision, not merely the 
procedures followed to produce it."
64
 Further, the relevant supervisor "must have the power to 
veto or modify particular decisions to ensure they accord with state policy," and the "mere 
potential" for such supervision is inadequate.
65
 Finally, "the state supervisor may not itself be an 
active market participant. In general, however, the adequacy of supervision otherwise will 
depend on all the circumstances of a case."
66
 
B. Dissent 
Justice Alito's dissent found the majority's reasoning to be "based on a serious 
misunderstanding" of the antitrust state action doctrine.
67
 For him, the Court took "the 
unprecedented step of holding that Parker does not apply to the North Carolina Board because 
the Board is not structured in a way that merits a good-government seal of approval."
68
 
Justice Alito then stated categorically that "Under Parker, the Sherman Act...and the 
Federal Trade Commission Act...do not apply to state agencies; the North Carolina Board of 
Dental Examiners is a state agency; and that is the end of the matter."
69
 Returning to this issue 
later, he concluded that the state of North Carolina had had an "agency" in mind when it passed 
the legislation creating the dental board.
70
 "As this regulatory regime demonstrates, North 
Carolina’s Board of Dental Examiners is unmistakably a state agency created by the state 
legislature to serve a prescribed regulatory purpose and to do so using the State’s power in 
cooperation with other arms of state government."
71
 
Justice Alito also observed that self-regulation of dentistry long antedated the Sherman 
Act.
72
 Further, when the antitrust laws were originally passed the scope of the Commerce Power 
was much narrower than it is today. "As a result, the Act did not pose a threat to traditional state 
regulatory activity," which generally applied only within its own borders.
73
 Further, "In 1890, the 
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64
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regulation of the practice of medicine and dentistry was regarded as falling squarely within the 
States’ sovereign police power." 
Like the majority, he also parsed earlier decisions, finding instances such as Parker itself 
that found immunity for purely private, self-interested conduct.
74
 While Midcal had required 
active state supervision, the party claiming immunity in that case was a private trade association, 
not a state agency.
75
 Justice Alito preferred to liken the dental agency in the present case to the 
municipality in Hallie. He found it "puzzling" that the majority treated the dental Board "less 
favorably than a municipality."
76
 Municipalities, he noted, are not sovereign, while agencies can 
and do exercise sovereign state functions. 
C. Analysis 
All members of the Court, including the three dissenters, agreed with the lower tribunals 
that active supervision was not present. The legal conclusions they drew were starkly different. 
The majority believed that state authorization was "rarely" sufficient standing alone, that it must 
usually be accompanied by supervision, and that supervision by a market participant never 
suffices.
77
 Municipalities and agencies in which a controlling number of decision-makers are 
either disinterested public officials or else persons other than active market participants may 
qualify. By contrast, the dissenters believed that authorization was sufficient any time the 
relevant actor had been designated by the state as an "agency," without regard to the interested 
and active market participation of the agency's decision-makers. 
On the exemption from the active supervision requirement given to municipalities, the 
majority emphasized one set of points—namely, (i) that municipal decision-making is most 
frequently made by disinterested public officials, (ii) that municipalities are "multi-sector," with 
regulatory obligations in many areas, and (iii) that most of the state action issues pertain to 
municipal decisions that are excessively parochial rather than blatant trade restraints such as 
price-fixing or market exclusion.
78
 For the dissenters, the main significance was that 
municipalities were non-sovereign institutions of local government, while agencies were created 
in order to carry out state policy.
79
 
On the nature of the likely restraints, the majority's observation that municipalities rarely 
engage in naked price-fixing or exclusion but are more likely to regulate for parochial or 
territorial reasons is generally justified by the case law. Typical municipally imposed restraints 
are things like tying of electric service to waste pick-up, use of land use provisions to limit 
providers, or limitations on ambulance or airport taxi access.
80
 By contrast, Parker, Midcal, 
Goldfarb, and N.C. Dental all involved participant-created price or output control that would 
have been per se unlawful at the time of those decisions. Further, while Justice Alito found it 
puzzling that the majority should treat agencies less favorably than municipalities, in fact the test 
that the majority created applied to both. Municipalities are entitled to regulate without 
                                                 
74
 135 S.Ct. at 1119–1121, discussing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 347-351 (1943). 
75
 135 S.Ct. at 1121. 
76
 Id. at 1122. 
77
 Id. at 1112. 
78
 Id. at 1112. 
79
 Id. at 1121–1122. 
80
 For analysis of the decisions, see 1A ANTITRUST LAW ¶223. 
CPI Antitrust Chronicle  April  2015 (2) 
 12 
independent state supervision because they act largely through elected government officials 
accountable through the political process. Presumably, if they should cede this power to an 
"agency" of active market participants—say, a taxicab commission composed of taxi owners—
they would also be subject to the supervision requirement under the majority's analysis. 
To be sure, municipalities cover a limited territory while state agencies often operate state 
wide, as the Board of Dental Examiners did. But that distinction has little relevance for purposes 
of assessing sovereign power. The more important differences are that the municipality is "multi-
sector," dealing with nearly the same range of regulatory issues that state government controls. 
This is particularly true of larger "home rule" cities that typically have most of the regulatory 
power of states, but limited to their own borders.
81
 In that setting the interests of one 
entrepreneurial group are more likely to be offset by those of a different group. Single-sector 
agencies, by contrast, typically have members whose interests are aligned—such as practicing 
dentists, all of whom could profit from a teeth-whitening cartel.  Further, municipalities have 
their own internal political processes, and their decisions-makers are answerable to the 
electorate. 
Both sides also agreed that the Dental Board's actions in this case were an instance of 
special interest agency "capture." They drew different conclusions from that premise as well. The 
majority embraced and the dissent rejected a link between the state action doctrine and special 
interest capture. Indeed, the dissent noted that in Parker v. Brown, the grandparent of state action 
cases, the relevant decision-makers were all market producers.
82
 
The dissent drew strong conclusions from the fact that regulation of dentistry was 
traditionally an intrastate activity that the Sherman Act very likely could not have reached at the 
time it was passed. That changed with the Supreme Court's Wickard case in 1942, which brought 
such markets within the reach of federal law provided that they had a sufficient effect on 
interstate commerce.
83
 What the dissent did not note is that the present case was brought under 
§5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, because the FTC has no direct authority to enforce the 
Sherman Act. At the time of Wickard and Parker, the FTC Act reached only activities "in 
commerce," but thirty years later it was amended to embrace all matters "in or affecting 
commerce," thus tracking the Wickard language.
84
 Congress clearly intended for the FTC Act to 
reach intrastate activities that affect commerce. 
One portion of the dissent's argument seems anachronistic. The dissenters dwelt at some 
length on Parker, which immunized what amounted to a state-sanctioned raisin cartel without 
assessing any kind of supervision by a disinterested state actor.
85
 For decades the Court struggled 
with the meaning of this decision, at one time suggesting that it required "compulsion."
86
 It did 
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not develop the modern two-prong test requiring "clear articulation" and "active supervision" 
(but not compulsion) until Midcal in 1980.
87
 Already in Goldfarb, however, the Court held that 
minimum price schedules promulgated by the Virginia Bar Association were not immune, in part 
because no independent agency—referring in this case to the Virginia Supreme Court—
supervised them.
88
 On this point Goldfarb and the dissent seem quite inconsistent, and the 
dissent did not attempt to resolve the conflict. In any event, the current majority was certainly not 
taking an "unprecedented step" as the dissent suggested.
89
 
The dissenters’ position that once a state-created "agency" is found, state action immunity 
for authorized conduct is automatic is hardly a foregone conclusion from the case law. The State 
Bar Association in Goldfarb had been designated "a state agency by law" in a 1938 statute 
creating an integrated state bar.
90
 The Ticor decision, which also involved state regulatory 
agencies, is somewhat different. There the "rating bureaus" were simply private cartels of title 
insurers, and the relevant state agencies rubber stamped their rate requests with little or no 
review.
91
 It is unclear, however, why rubber stamping by the insurance agency is insufficient, 
given that it is an agency with the authority to make its own unsupervised substantive decisions 
in this market. If it exercises by rubber stamping, that would be all the law requires under the 
dissenters' view.
92
 In Cantor, a state agency, the Michigan Public Service Commission, had 
approved a privately owned electric utility's practice of providing "free" light bulbs to utility 
customers, later challenged as a tying arrangement.
93
 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court 
disapproved the arrangement. In sum, the majority's approach was hardly "unprecedented," as 
the dissent suggested.
94
 Rather, it was more responsive to the Court's long list of admittedly 
fumbling and confusing precedents, while the dissent dwelt at length on Parker. 
Fundamentally, the dispute between the majority and the dissent centered on the 
questions of "how much federalism" vs. "how much national competition policy." For the 
dissenters all the state need do is declare that a group of private actors is an "agency" and that is 
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the end of the matter. Apparently, the state could simply create an agency of taxicab drivers, 
authorize them to select several among their members as decision-makers, and then give them 
the authority to fix taxicab prices, with no further oversight required. This fact did not appear to 
trouble the dissenters because the state as sovereign is competent to deal with the matter itself. 
On this point, the majority's view seems more realistic about legislative processes. For the 
dissenters all that was required was the formality that the state designate the association as an 
agency, perhaps decades prior to the challenged action, as was so in this case.
95
 
The dissenters' observation that dentistry was traditionally self-regulated
96
 also seems 
beside the point of the federalism issue, and perhaps even cuts the other way. The Commerce 
Clause identifies the line between federal governmental and state governmental power, not the 
line between federal governmental power and private conduct. Entrepreneurial self-regulation 
implies a division of authority as between the government on one side and private enterprise on 
the other. Indeed, to the extent that a tradition of self-regulation is relevant it suggests that the 
states were not involved. This fact should create more room—rather than less—for an expansion 
of federal power. While federal regulatory power under the Commerce Clause is properly limited 
by state governmental activity, it is not limited by things that are within Congressional reach and 
in which the state does not play a part. 
For considerations of federalism, the extraterritorial effect or lack of it seems to be much 
more significant, although the point was ignored by both the majority and the dissent. Ironically, 
the raisin cartel found to be immune in Parker makes a better case for non-immunity than the 
dentists' cartel in North Carolina Dental. Under the program at issue in Parker ten producers of 
an agricultural commodity could request that the Commissioner create a "prorate" Committee for 
that product. The Committee was composed of several producers of the commodity, although the 
Commission had discretion to add two distribution members, such as canners or other handlers.
97
 
At that point the producer-dominated committee issued production allocation decisions, and all 
growers in the covered area were required to comply. Most significantly, in Parker nearly all of 
the raisins produced under the quotas were shipped outside of the state of California, making the 
state's raisin growers an enormous beneficiary of the cartel while visiting the consumer harm 
elsewhere.
98
 Whether the non-dominant "distribution" members of the Committee were injured 
or benefitted would depend on their markup. Ordinarily intermediaries would suffer from an 
upstream cartel in the distributed product unless they were compensated by affected producers. 
By contrast, in North Carolina Dental it seems clear that most of those purchasing teeth-
whitening services in North Carolina are also residents of that state. Further, states have their 
own regulatory provisions as well as their own antitrust laws. These can also be deployed against 
the anticompetitive acts of state professional associations (whether or not they are denominated 
"agencies") if the state legislatures or courts so choose.
99
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The majority thought that an important use of federal antitrust policy is to force a layer of 
transparency through more public control of the state's own governmental processes, quite aside 
from any question about extraterritorial spillovers. The Court emphasized that: 
Immunity for state agencies...requires more than a mere facade of state 
involvement, for it is necessary in light of Parker 's rationale to ensure the States 
accept political accountability for anticompetitive conduct they permit and 
control.
100
 
Further, this concern about transparency is important even if the goal is to protect the 
residents of a state from their state's own anticompetitive decisions. The Court spoke repeatedly 
of unsupervised private conduct that deviated from the state's own interest, stating "Entities 
purporting to act under state authority might diverge from the State’s considered definition of the 
public good,"
101
 and that the federal antitrust concern is to identify when the private decision-
maker "is acting to further his own interests, rather than the governmental interests of the 
state."
102
 Interestingly, the dissenters did not push this point, even though all three (Justices 
Alito, Scalia, and Thomas) are strongly sympathetic with concerns of federalism and state self-
determination. 
The dissent also objected that the majority's identification of "capture" with control by 
market participants was "crude," and that determining when capture has occurred is "no simple 
task."
103
 That observation is certainly factually correct, and political history is filled with 
instances in which even salaried government officials were captured by the entities that they 
were supposed to be regulating.
104
 Perhaps the more pertinent question is whether disciplining 
the decision-making of self-interested market participants is a worthwhile activity when other 
decision- makers who are not market participants might act improperly as well. 
The best answer is that even imperfect law can be better than no law at all. For example, 
a policy of removing drunk drivers from the road is worthwhile, even though not every accident 
is caused by a drunk. Self-interested market participants are highly likely to be compromised in 
favor of their own industry and may even rationalize that their decisions are best for the public as 
well. Salaried government officials may or may not be excessively beholden to the industries that 
they are intended to regulate, but capture cannot simply be presumed, and the political process 
with its checks and balances provides greater control. This is particularly true of multi-sector 
government regulators, who face conflicting pressures from competing interest groups. 
Finally, the dissent fretted that the rule adopted by the majority would increase the risk of 
antitrust treble damages exposure to those who serve on state agencies. While that problem 
seems manageable, it does have to be managed. Damages actions seem to be almost a foregone 
conclusion. As the majority pointed out, the very objection launched by most dentists to non-
dentist teeth whitening, and which provoked the dental association's rule, was that the non-
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dentists were charging a lower price.
105
 This evidence not only creates an inference that higher 
prices resulted, but also provides a yardstick for measuring the extent of the overcharge. 
 The most obvious way for state agency officials to avoid antitrust exposure is to ensure 
that potentially anticompetitive decision-making be supervised by economically disinterested 
government officials. Another is to ensure that majority control over potentially anticompetitive 
professional decisions not be vested in market participants. A third is use of the antitrust 
mechanisms themselves, including the rule of reason for most professional rules that are 
reasonably intended to promote socially valuable practices, and the per se rule for the occasional 
situation where a professional association oversteps, as occurred in this case. 
It is worth noting that standard-setting is ubiquitous in the American economy and is 
hardly limited to professional organizations. In most cases those setting standards have no 
immunity, but have simply learned to live within antitrust parameters. The courts, for their part, 
have learned to appreciate the competitive and other social values of collaborative setting of 
standards. As a result most, although not all, of such practices survive antitrust scrutiny.
106
 Of 
course, this risk may be acceptable for a market participant but not for a citizen who volunteers 
as a public service. 
Finally, the majority did not rule out the possibility of simple state court supervision by 
judges, provided that the review extended to the substance and not merely the procedure.
107
 The 
Court approved a roughly similar process in Hoover, concluding that substantive review by the 
state supreme court, acting in a quasi-legislative capacity as manager, eliminated the need for a 
separate supervision requirement.
108
 By contrast, Goldfarb denied immunity after finding that the 
state's supreme court did not supervise the bar's practices.
109
 This adjustment may require a 
modification of state administrative procedure acts or collateral legislation so as to provide for 
more substantive judicial review when a threat to competition is apparent. The court may then be 
empowered to appoint one or more special masters or other experts to evaluate the proposed rule. 
The majority concluded that the states could readily indemnify agency members. Of 
course, indemnification does not remove treble damages but provides that those damages must 
be paid by the state and its taxpayers rather than the designated citizen officials themselves. That 
in itself, however, might be a good discipline against anticompetitive conduct. 
III. CONCLUSION 
How much can a state default on its sovereign obligations and continue to be called 
sovereign? The standard that the Supreme Court has developed is actually not all that high. The 
final decision must come from a government decision-maker with power to review and 
disapprove, but largely under any standard that the state wishes to articulate. What the state 
cannot do, however, is simply paste the label "sovereign" or "agency" on a purely private actor. 
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Neither the North Carolina Dental majority or dissent expressed much concern about 
whether the anticompetitive conduct in question was self-deterring, and thus more addressable 
through the state's own political processes. The raisin cartel in Parker was an economically 
rational act for the state of California, because the beneficiaries were within the state while 
nearly all of the victims were elsewhere. Under Midcal a state could, if it wished, articulate a 
policy of supporting cartels of products in which local producers were dominant in the market 
but buyers were mainly outside. That policy would increase the state's wealth and might even 
attain voter support as a revenue device. If the state adequately articulated that policy and final 
decisions were made by a governmental official, that would be the end of the matter insofar as 
antitrust is concerned.  By contrast, assuming that the teeth-whitening cartel is harmful—and the 
evidence strongly suggested that it was—the net harm in the Dental case was experienced mainly 
by residents of North Carolina who purchased teeth-whitening services. As a general proposition 
cartels are socially costly because the aggregate harm to purchasers exceeds the aggregate 
benefit to cartel members.
110
 
 In that case North Carolina's failure to supervise was injuring its own economy, but why 
shouldn't it have that right? The important qualifier is that the effects of the cartel must be 
internalized, with both beneficiaries and the burdened located within the state. Under the two-
prong test for the antitrust "state action" immunity this question of internalization is rarely 
relevant. Federal antitrust law reaches almost everywhere, certainly to a highly commercial 
profession such as dentistry, notwithstanding that most dentist-patient transactions are intrastate. 
Further, the two-prong Midcal test for state action is well established and does not make the 
location of antitrust harm relevant. The fact remains, however, that North Carolina Dental 
presents a weaker case for federal intrusion than did Parker. 
The Dental case reflects greater paternalism, protecting North Carolina citizens from 
their own deficient governmental decisions. Indeed, the majority in the Dental case articulated 
the supervision requirement as querying whether the practice "promotes state policy" rather than 
the defendant's individual interests.
111
 This recalled the query in the Phoebe Putney case into 
whether a non-sovereign actor has "an incentive to pursue [its] own self-interest under the guise 
of implementing state policies."
112
 At the same time, however, the degree of paternalism is 
relatively modest—no more than necessary to force the state to make its own policy more public 
to its own citizens. 
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